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Millennium  Development  Goal  number  8  (MDG8)  concerns  those  external  flows 
(Official Development Assistance, trade and debt relief) that ought to help developing 
countries achieve the MDGs by 2015. This paper  reviews the role of these MDG8-
related external flows in the case of Bolivia. Riding on high international prices for its 
major exports, and on fiscal expansion, remittances and debt forgiveness, Bolivia has 
experienced  solid  economic  performance  in  the  past  few  years.  This  economic 
performance  coupled  with  the  recent  increase  in  social  public  expenditures  by  the 
government has increased the likelihood that the country will achieve all of the MDGs 
by 2015, except probably for MDG 2. These advances have been achieved in a period 
of  radical  change  in  Bolivia’s  dependence  on  MDG8-related  external  flows.  The 
composition of external finance in public expenditure has shifted from domination by 
ODA and debt forgiveness in the first half of the decade to domination by trade, mainly 
through revenues from hydrocarbon exports.  Our findings  support the  idea that the 
provision  of  additional  financial  resources  may  not  be  the  priority  with  regard  to 
organising support to MDG achievements. Spending efficiently and effectively seems to 
be a more important area for support in Bolivia. As far as trade is concerned, Bolivia 
already enjoys good market access in its main markets, thus better access through 
lower non-tariff barriers may be more relevant than improving access in terms of tariffs. 
Moreover access to markets would be easier if Bolivia were better integrated with world 
markets, with its regional neighbours in particular. This calls for the support of the 
international community through aid for trade (AfT), which has instead been worryingly 
dwindling in recent years. Finally, we argue that MDG8 could be pursued in Bolivia 
through support for improving access to technology and access to affordable drugs. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Bolivia has historically been one of the poorest countries in Latin America, with high incidence of 
poverty and a fairly dismal record in terms of social indicators. Such a poor record has been mainly 
explained along ethnic and geographical lines, with poverty and underdevelopment concentrated 
among the indigenous populations and the highland areas. In this context, reaching the Millennium 
Development  Goals  (MDGs)  set  in  1990  is  a  particularly  important  challenge  for  the  country. 
Reducing  (extreme) poverty  by half  would  imply  lifting  a  large  chunk  of  the  population out of 
poverty.  Similarly  sizable  leaps  forward  were  required  when  the  targets  were  set  in  1990  to 
immunise all children against measles and malaria and achieve universal primary education.  
 
Advances  in  the  attainment  of  the  MDGs  required  a  robust  period  of  economic  performance 
accompanied by a major focus on social spending. Riding on high international prices for its major 
exports (hydrocarbons and mining), and on fiscal expansion, remittances and debt forgiveness, 
Bolivia has experienced solid economic performance in the past few years. This has also allowed 
the  country  to  emerge  from  the  recent  global  downturn  in  relatively  good  shape,  having  not 
suffered major negative impacts as a result of the crisis. Moreover, the government has recently 
increased its social public expenditures, disposing of more resources (mainly from hydrocarbon 
revenues)  and  increasing  the  share  of  public  spending  to  the  social  sector.  These  positive 
developments have increased the likelihood that the country will achieve the majority of the MDGs 
by 2015. For those on which Bolivia seems to be off track, we have tried to identify some indicative 
levels with regard to the financial resources gap to fill, building on recent work by Vos et al. (2009). 
 
This review is matched by an analysis of the most important external flows which could help the 
country fill the financial gap, i.e. trade, debt and  official development assistance (ODA). These 
represent the core flows underlying MDG 8. Section 3 will describe such flows and provide some 
evidence  that  the  role  of  external  actors  in  accompanying  the  country’s  efforts  towards  MDG 
achievement has somewhat lots prominence as the country has shifted from external dependence 
to domestic resource mobilisation. A major driver of the shift has been the increased reliance on 
trade – through revenues from hydrocarbon exports – which has largely replaced the role played 
by debt forgiveness and ODA in financing social spending.  
 
In  light  of  this  scenario  and  of  its  possible  evolution,  we  identify  some  ways  in  which  the 
international community could be instrumental to accompanying the process of MDG achievements 
in Bolivia in line with the fulfilment of MDG 8.  
   2 
2.  Context and progress in reaching MDGs 
 
2.1  Overall macroeconomic context  
 
During the first half of the decade, Bolivia suffered the effects of the international economic crisis, 
characterised  by  a  slowdown  in  economic  growth,  increased  unemployment,  large  fiscal 
imbalances and an acute process of credit  crunch in the banking system.  Acute shortages of 
resources prevented the government from implementing countercyclical policies aimed at boosting 
aggregate demand and activity and at ameliorating the negative effects of the crisis on the most 
vulnerable segments of society. 
 
Starting from  2006,  however,  the  country  began  to  benefit from  an  extraordinary  international 
economic  environment.  The  prices  of  the  main  commodities  exported  by  Bolivia,  such  as 
hydrocarbons  and  minerals,  experienced  significant  increases  in  world  markets.  As  a  result, 
Bolivia’s export revenues went up from $2.2 billion in 2004 to $6.8 billion in 2008. Hydrocarbon 
exports jumped from $851 million to $3.5 billion in the same years. This significant boost, coupled 
with an increase in the royalty rate paid on hydrocarbon production, which was approved in the 
new Hydrocarbon Law of 2005, represented a major increase in fiscal revenues. Moreover, Bolivia 
benefited from a significant reduction in its external public debt, under the G8 initiative. Between 
2005 and 2008, the public external debt that Bolivia owed to multilateral organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) was reduced by $ 2.9 billion, equivalent to 64% of the stock of public debt Bolivia owed to 
multilateral institutions at the end of 2004. Furthermore, remittances by Bolivian nationals who had 
migrated abroad experienced an increase, jumping from $169 million in 2004 to $1.1  billion in 
2008. This had a significant impact on Bolivian households’ incomes, which in turn contributed to 
reducing poverty incidence.  
 
As a result of all these positive shocks and events, Bolivia’s fiscal position improved considerably. 
The  consolidated fiscal  balance presented  surpluses averaging 3%  of  gross  domestic product 
(GDP) between 2006 and 2008. The Bolivian government for the first time counted on sufficient 
resources to implement social policies that could eventually have a significant impact in terms of 
poverty reduction, and that would bring Bolivia on track towards the MDGs.  
 
The outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008 found Bolivia in a relatively strong position to 
cope with the negative effects of the crisis (Jemio and Nina, 2010). The crisis reduced growth but 
Bolivia still presented a positive growth rate in 2009. Fiscal revenues went down, without causing a 
fiscal imbalance. The positive fiscal position allowed the government to implement countercyclical 
policies in order to offset the negative effects of the crisis on the poorest segments of the society. 
Thus, the crisis did not have a considerable negative impact in terms of bringing Bolivia off its track 
towards achieving the MDGs (see Box 1 for more details). 
 
This section discusses how Bolivia has performed in terms of attaining each of the MDGs over time 
and how economic cycles have affected the effectiveness of policies aimed at attaining the MDGs. 
 
Box 1: Bolivia and the global financial crisis 
The global financial crisis has had an adverse effect on the Bolivian economy through external shocks that 
have  transmitted into  the  economy  by means  of  several  channels  and  mechanisms.  Commodity  export 
prices have reduced significantly, causing a drop in export incomes, fiscal revenues and economic activity. 
However, the crisis has had a limited effect on the Bolivian economy. Since the outbreak of the crisis, Bolivia 
has managed to keep the macroeconomic equilibria and a comfortable level of foreign exchange reserves. 
Inflation has been  brought down from the high levels observed in 2007 and 2008. Bank deposits have 
steadily increased despite the very negative levels of the real interest rates. Bank lending increased as well 
albeit at a much slower pace. Growth rates dropped, but stood at positive levels. The Government has   3 
undertaken  counter-cyclical  policies  in  order  to  ameliorate  the  negative  effects  of  the  external  shocks. 
Besides, commodity price drops have been only temporal, because they have tended to recover after the 
initial  reduction  took  place.  This  occurred  in  the  case  of  hydrocarbons  and  mining  sectors.  Although 
commodity prices have not returned to the pre-crisis levels, they are still very high if compared with the levels 
existing in 2004. 
 
Main macroeconomic indicators 
 
 
2.2  Progress on reaching the MDGs in Bolivia 
 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
 
The MDG of eradicating poverty and hunger is closely related to economic activity and to economic 
cycles. The economic crisis witnessed at the beginning of the decade had a negative effect on 
employment and income. Despite this, during the period Bolivia managed to make some progress 
in terms of reducing poverty incidence. Moderate poverty incidence, at the national level, reduced 
from 66.4% in 2000 to 60.6% in 2005. Extreme poverty incidence, on the other hand, went down 
from  45.1%  to  38.2%  during  the  same  period.  The  downward  trend  followed  by  the  index  of 
extreme  poverty  incidence  continued  during  the  second  half  of  the  decade.  Extreme  poverty 
incidence went down from 38.2% in 2005 to 31.8% in 2009 (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Population below $1 a day (%) 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
Clearly Bolivia is on track towards attaining the target of halving, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day. The MDG target is to reduce extreme 
poverty incidence to 24.1% by 2015. Government projections estimate that by that year extreme 
poverty incidence will be reduced to 22.3%. Bolivia is also close to attaining the target of reducing 
the prevalence of child malnutrition of children under three to 19% by 2015. However, this index 
remained practically constant at 25% during the 1990s, and thus a significant effort needs to be 
made in order to attain the MDG target (Figure 2).  In recent years, the government has taken 
2004 2008 2009
GDP Growth 4.2 6.1 3.3
Exports (Billion US$) 2.2 6.4 4.8
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 3.9 12.0 3.5
International Reserves (Billion US$) 1.1 7.7 8.8
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -5.6 2.8 0.1
Total Government Expenditures (% pf GDP) 32.6 36.5 32.6
MDG Related Government Expenditures (% pf GDP) 12.5 13.8 14.0
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significant steps to reduce poverty and improve social safety nets. Various government agencies 
are implementing a number of social programmes aimed at reducing poverty. Among them is the 
extreme poverty eradication programme Plan Vida, featuring a phased approach with an initial 
focus  on  the  poorest  geographic  areas.  In  addition,  various  cash  transfers  have  become  an 
important  component  of  social  policies,  including  the  Renta  Dignidad,  a  universal  pension 
introduced in 2008 – replacing and augmenting the former Bonosol – for all Bolivians aged 60 and 
above, equivalent to about $340 per year, with reduced benefits for those receiving any other 
pension. It is financed by a fixed share of the special hydrocarbon tax (IDH), with contributions 
from all levels of government. 
 
The authorities report that social policies are yielding important results, including a reduction in 
extreme poverty of 4.8 percentage points in 2008 (especially in rural areas). 
 
Figure 2: Prevalence of child malnutrition (% of children under 3) 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 
 
Available data suggest that Bolivia is off track in attaining the education goal of achieving universal 
primary  education.  During  the  2000s,  Bolivia  has  not  made  significant  progress  in  terms  of 
ensuring that, by 2015, children will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. The net 
primary enrolment ratio has practically remained constant, at 94% during the whole period 2001-
2008 (Figure 3). This generates some concerns regarding the feasibility of attaining the country’s 
target of 100% primary school enrolment by 2015. As Vos et al. (2008) have pointed out, the main 
challenge for Bolivia is to keep children in school and to improve the internal efficiency of the 
primary schooling system by reducing both repetition and dropout rates.  
 
However, owing to the fiscal revenue boom experienced in recent years, Bolivia is in a much better 
position  to  conduct  a  more  aggressive  policy  aimed  at  approaching  this  and  other  MDGs. 
Government has already significantly increased its spending on education, which went up at an 
annual average real rate of 7.9%, during the period 2006-2008. The much larger quantities of 
resources  devoted  to  education  have  not  yet  produced  significant  results  in  terms  of  MDGs 
achievements, but they are expected to contribute to this end in the following years. However, it is 
necessary to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the way these enlarged resources are being 
spent.  
 
Furthermore,  it  is  important  to  consider  that  the  amount  of  marginal  public  spending  that  is 
necessary to achieve the MDGs towards the end of the period is larger as the goal is already 
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The Bono Juancito Pinto was established in 2007 as a conditional cash transfer programme aiming 
to reduce school dropout rates by offering an annual cash transfer equivalent to about $30 for all 
children attending public primary schools. This could greatly contribute towards improving Bolivia’s 
performance on this particular MDG. Authorities report a decline in school dropout rates from 5.2% 
to 2.8% following the introduction of the Bono Juancito Pinto and a reduction in the illiteracy rate. 
 
Figure 3: Net primary enrolment ratio (% of relevant age group) 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
As  discussed  above,  Bolivia  seems  to  be  off  target  in  terms  of  attaining  the  full  net  primary 
enrolment target. Thus, the target of reaching the primary school completion target of 100% by the 
year  2015  will  be  even  more  difficult  to  attain.  The  percentage  of  cohorts  reaching  Grade  8 
increased from 74% in 2001 to 79.5% in 2004. It decreased to 77.8% in 2005 and to 75.6% in 2006 
(Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Percentage of cohorts reaching Grade 8 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 
 
The target of gender equality and empowering women has been already attained. Target 4, on 
eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all 


















































































Net primary enrollment ratio (percent of relevant age group)
Net primary enrollment ratio projection (percent of relevant age group)
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Percentage of cohort reaching grade 8 Percentage of cohort reaching grade 8 (projection)
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Figure 5: Gender disparities at completion of primary education (%) 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
Figure 6: Gender disparities at completion of secondary education (%) 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality 
 
Bolivia appears to be on track on the health goal of reducing child mortality. Child mortality rates 
have declined substantially over the past decades. The infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) 
decreased from 81.9 in 1989 to 67.3 in 2001 and to 44 in 2007. The target for this particular MDG 
is to reduce the child mortality rate to 30 (Figure 7). 
 
Public spending in the health sector  has  increased over time. Between 1995 and 2005,  these 
expenditures went up at an annual average rate of 6.6% in real terms. Despite the large availability 
of resources enjoyed by the public sector, government expenditures in the health sector dropped at 



































































































































































Gender disparities at completion of secondary education (percent) MDG Target Public Spending on Education  7 
Figure 7: Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)  
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
The rate of immunisation against measles (percent of children under 12 months) has also exhibited 
substantial improvements over time, increasing from 68% in 1994 to 82.6% in 2006. The target for 
this specific MDG is 95% (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Immunisation against measles (% of children under 12 months) 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health 
 
In the same way, Bolivia appears to be on track to improve maternal health. The maternal mortality 
rate dropped from 416 per 100,000 live births in 1998 to 235 in 1998 and 214 in 2004. The target is 
to reduce this ratio to 104 by 2015 (Figure 9).  
 
Bolivia is on track as well in terms of increasing the proportion of births attended by skilled health 
personnel. This ratio went up from 25% in 1994 to 54% in 2000 and 65% in 2006. The target is to 
increase this ratio to 70% by 2015 (Figure 10). 
 
The much better fiscal position the country  is enjoying at present can help the government to 
undertake the necessary actions to improve Bolivia’s prospects to attain this goal.  
 
The Bono Juana Azurduy, a conditional cash transfer programme introduced in 2009 for pregnant 


























































































































































Immunization against measles (percent of children under 12-months) MDG Target Public Spending on Health  8 
bonus is aimed at improving maternal care, reducing infant mortality and improving nutrition; the 
equivalent of about $150 is paid for regular prenatal and paediatric medical checkups. 
 
Figure 9: Maternal mortality ratio (modelled estimate, per 100,000 live births) 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
Figure 10: Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (%) 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
 
According  to  official  estimates,  Bolivia  is  relatively  on  track  in  terms  of  achieving  the  goal  of 
combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases.  
 
Target 7: Halt by 2015, and begin to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS has been already attained, in 
2007. HIV prevalence among the population aged 15 to 24 had been increasing in past years, 
reaching 19% of the target population by 2006. By 2007 however, that ratio was reduced to 13.3 
percent, which is almost the target value for 2015 (Figure 11).  
 
Bolivia is also on track in terms of achieving the target of reducing the prevalence of malaria. 
Incidence of malaria was dramatically reduced from 24 per 1000 people in 1998 to 4.2 per 1000 
people in 2008, against the MDG target of 2 per 1000 people (Figure 12). 
 
However,  Bolivia  is  off  track  in  term  of  achieving  the  target  of  increasing  the  incidence  of 



























































































































































Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (percent) MDG Target Public Spending on Health  9 
from 72.1% in 2000 to 81.9 in 2008. According to official forecasts, this would rise to 85% by 2015, 
against the MDG target of 95% (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 11: HIV prevalence, total (% ages 15-24) 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
Figure 12: Incidence of malaria (per 1000 people) 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
Figure 13: Incidence of tuberculosis cases cured (% of diagnosed) 
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Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
 
In terms of ensuring environmental sustainability, Bolivia has succeeded in improving the access of 
the population to potable water. The proportion of the population with access to potable water went 
up from 57.5% in 1992 to 72% in 2001 and 75.5% in 2007. Bolivia is basically on track on this 
particular MDG, since the target for 2015 is to attain the goal of 78.5% of the Bolivian population 
with access to drinking water. According to government projections, this ratio will be of 81.8% by 
that year (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14: Access to potable water (% of population) 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
Likewise,  access  of  the  population  to  improved  sanitation  facilities  has  increased  over  time. 
However, Bolivia seems to be off track on this particular target. The percentage of the population 
with access to this basic service rose from 28% in 1992 to 40.7% in 2001 and 46.8% in 2007 
(Figure 15).  The  target for 2015  is  to  increase  coverage  of  sanitation  services  to 64%  of  the 
population, which will require a significant effort in terms of investment.  
 
Figure 15: Access to improved sanitation facilities (% of population) 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years). 
 
Table 1 summarises achievements of Bolivia in terms of the MDGs indicators. The country is set to 
achieve most of its targets. In particular, it has already achieved MDG 3 (gender equality) and is on 
track to accomplish all of the MDGs but Goal 2 (education). That is despite increasingly larger 
public expenditure in education (see above), which hints at other constraints to the achievement of 
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Table 1: MDG indicators in Bolivia 
 
Source: UDAPE (various years) and IMF (2009). 
 
Forecast  Target  MDG 
2000  2006  2007  2008  2015  2015  Situation 
Poverty 
   Population below US$ 1 a day (in percentage)  34.5  37.7  31.5  22.3  24.1  On Track 
Education 
   Net primary enrollment ratio (percent of relevant age group)  92.7  93.7  94.4  95.4   100    Off-Track 
   Percentage of cohort reaching grade 8  75.6  80.6  82.4  90   100    Off-Track 
   Gender disparities at completion of primary education (percent)  -0.6  0  Achieved 
   Gender disparities at completion of secondary education (percent)  3.4  -1.5  0  Achieved 
Health 
   Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 89 (1990)  53.6  44  30  30  On Track 
   Immunization against measles (percent of children under 12-months)  91  82.6  85  95  Off-Track 
   Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)  176  104  104  On Track 
   Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (percent)  54  65  70  70  On Track 
   HIV prevalence, total (percent ages 15-24)  5  19.2  13.3  13  13  On Track 
   Incidence of malaria (per 1,000 people)  8.4  5.2  4.2  2  2  On Track 
   Incidence of tuberculosis cases cured (percent of diagnosed)  71.2  82.9  81.9  85  95  Off-Track 
Sanitation 
   Access to potable water (percent of population)  73.1  75.5  81.8  78.5  On Track 
   Access to improved sanitation facilities (percent of population)  55.7  46.8  71.3  64  On Track 12 
2.3  Computing the financial needs gap: comparison with existing 
projections  
 
Although  Bolivia  appears  to  be  on  target  to  achieve  many  of  the  MDGs  according  to  official 
estimates, the country is off target to reach a number of them, as shown in the Table 1. Thus, one 
could argue that additional funding is required to scale up public spending in order to accelerate 
progress on those indicators. This is the exercise carried out by Vos et al. (2008), who use a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the additional public spending required 
by different Latin American countries, including Bolivia, in order to achieve MDGs.
1 In a follow-up 
study (Vos et al., 2009), the authors incorporate new projections in light of the expected (negative) 
effects of the crisis on Latin American economies. The results suggest that Bolivia should increase 
its public spending by at least 1.7% of GDP (in the best case scenario where the entire additional 
spending is financed by external grants) to achieve the MDGs. In the worst case scenario , when 
additional spending had to be raised through income tax increases , additional spending would be 
higher, at 2.8% of GDP, as the increased income tax would stifle economic growth. Moreover , the 
crisis would negatively affect the Bolivian economy, further increasing the additional financial gaps 
for the country. In both studies, the least costly and only feasible strategy for Bolivia would be to 
have the additional public spending funded  entirely through external grants. We argue below that 
these forecasts are rather pessimistic and that Bolivia should be able to fund the additional public 
spending without resorting to increases in income taxes or external funds, as it has been doing in 
the past four years. 
 
It is not entirely clear that lack of finances is a major impediment to the achievement of the goals, 
as even in those instances where Bolivia is off track to achieve a specific target public spending 
related to that target has increased, often by a higher percentage than that suggested by Vos et al. 
(2008). Perhaps more importantly, the studies do not incorporate information on  some key events 
that have impacted on the Bolivian economy in recent years and thus have considerably changed 
the  country ’s  macroeconomic  and  fiscal  position.  This  lack  of  detailed  information  is 
understandable in light of the characteristics of the studies: they focus on a fairly large number of 
countries  and  base  their  analysis  on  a  CGE  model  common  to  all  countries.  Conversely,  by 
analysing only one country, we can dig deeper into the country’s data and base our analysis on 
more detailed and updated information. 
 
The analyses by Vos et al. use data that do not include the very recent important developments of 
the Bolivian economy, chiefly the significant increases in external and fiscal revenues owing to the 
export commodity boom occurring between 2006 and 2009. The positive shocks the economy has 
experienced in recent years have greatly improved the country’s fiscal stance and have enlarged 
tax revenues from the hydrocarbon sector. These patterns have completely changed the structure 
of public sector finances. Budget reliance on foreign grants, significant at the beginning of the 
decade, has considerably reduced in recent years. The bulk of the government balance is being 
financed  by  hydrocarbon  tax  revenues.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  public  spending  in  Bolivia  has 
increased in recent years well above the additional public spending figure required to reach  the 
MDGs according to Vos et al. (it increased from 29.8% to 34.6% of GDP between 2006 and 2008 
according to IMF (2009) figures). Interestingly, this increase has been achieved without increasing 
income  taxes.  Virtually all  of  it has  been financed by  increased hydrocarbon  and  (to  a  lesser 
extent) indirect taxes, such as value-added tax (VAT).  
 
Despite the high growth rates in MDG-related public spending exhibited in recent years, Bolivia has 
not accordingly improved on some key MDG indicators, such as those related to universal primary 
education enrolment and attainment. This fact highlights that there are large inefficiencies in the 
way these sizable additional resources are being spent at present. The lack of efficiency in public 
expenditure  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  a  large  chunk  of  public  expenses  in  Bolivia  is 
                                                 
1 However, in the case of Bolivia they exclude MDG 5 from the analysis. 13 
undertaken at the decentralised level, municipalities and regional governments. A large number of 
small municipalities have capacity problems to use these resources efficiently in order to improve 
the MDG indicators. 
 
There are also some differences in the data on the MDGs indicators used by Vos et al. with those 
we present above. According to the former, Bolivia is off track on practically all the MDGs and, 
based on the simulation exercises carried out, will be unable to meet most of the targets unless 
significant additional funding materialises. However, as noted in the previous section (based on 
official  data  from  the  ministries),  Bolivia  has  already  achieved  the  MDG  of  attaining  gender 
equality. The indicators also show that Bolivia will be able to achieve the MDGs related to poverty 
eradication, child mortality, maternal health and access to drinking water. The country is off track in 
attaining  the  MDGs  on  universal  education  and  on  improving  the access  of  the population  to 
sanitary services. The improved fiscal position Bolivia is enjoying at present is likely to help the 
country make significant progresses on achieving those MDGs as well.  
 
Similarly, total public spending and MDG-related public spending in the Vos et al. studies appear to 
be underestimated relatively to official figures. The studies estimate that total MDG-related public 
expenditures in 2000 were at 4.8% of GDP, while the Bolivian government Unit for the Analysis of 
Social and Economic Policies (UDAPE), the institution that calculates the official figures on  the 
MDGs and related expenditures in Bolivia, estimates that this figure was as high as 10.8% in the 
same year. 
 
Finally, in the follow-up study (Vos et al., 2009), the authors anticipate that the global financial 
crisis  would have a significant negative effect on the Bolivian economy and  this would in turn 
generate the need for further funding to reach MDGs. As explained above and shown in detail by 
Jemio and Nina (2010), the effects of the crisis have been relatively mild and the economy has 
continued growing, albeit at a lower rate, and the public balance has not experienced significant 
disequilibria. 
 
We believe these arguments and the evidence presented in this and the next section are strong 
enough to consider that external additional resources is not a primary requirement to achieve the 
MDGs in Bolivia as long as future public spending bounces stays at the level of 2008 (34% of 
GDP). As mentioned, this level would be more than enough to cover the additional public spending 
envisaged by Vos et al. (2009) in the worst case scenario. Such a level of public spending is what 
the government projects for the years to 2015 given conservative estimates of economic growth 
below the 2005-2008 period, i.e. 4% per annum (IMF, 2009). In other words, the financial gap that 
may exist to achieve those targets that have not been achieved yet by Bolivia should be fundable 
with the expected pattern of public spending.  
 
The fact that additionality of resources (to what is projected to be available) should not be a key 
factor in achieving the MDGs is further confirmed by the fact that the area of social spending, 
which  has  recently  exhibited  the  highest  growth,  i.e.  education,  is  also  the  area  where  most 
problems to achieve the MDGs are envisaged. That lack of progress owes mainly to the sluggish 
growth of education-related indicators despite the robust growth of related public spending (by 30% 
between 2006 and 2008). This points to the critical importance of reviewing the effectiveness of 
public spending in Bolivia, not just the total envelope. 
 
As we said, additionality should not be a major issue as long as Bolivia can keep raising and 
spending  enough  public  funds.  This  condition  is  dependent  on  two  main  factors:  natural  gas 
exports keep at least at the same level as in 2008 (i.e. the international price bounces back to 2008 
levels and the supply remains at least constant) and economic growth keeps at a reasonable level 
to  maintain direct and  indirect taxes,  i.e.  at  least  4%.  Both  conditions  seem  to  be achievable 
considering the current trend in gas prices and Bolivian economic growth, but constant monitoring 
would be needed.  
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3.  Trends in relation to trade, debt and aid 
 
How have the major external flows – trade, debt and ODA – that could help fund the financial 
needs gaps to achieve the MDGs evolved in the past decade? What role have they played in 
funding  MDG-related  sector  spending?  What  role  could  they  play  in  the  future?  This  section 
presents an analysis of the evolution of these flows that can help answer these questions. 
 
3.1   Trade analysis 
 
As mentioned above, booming international demand for the main commodities in Bolivia’s export 
basket, especially natural gas and mining, has probably been the major factor in boosting the 
country’s economic performance and its fiscal revenues.  
 
Bolivia’s exports are dominated by natural resources such as natural gas, zinc, silver ore and 
soybean cake. In 2009, over 95% of the category ‘mineral fuels, oils distillation products etc’ was 
accounted for by natural gas. Zinc accounted for almost 47% and silver 40% of ‘ores, slag and 
ash’;  soybean  cake  accounted  for  around  92%  of  ‘residues,  wastes  of  food  industry,  animal 
fodder’. Over the period 2001-2009, ‘ores, slag and ash’ was the fastest growing product category. 
Most exports of natural gas are destined for Brazil. Most zinc is destined for South Korea. Most 
soybean cake is destined for other regional partners such as Venezuela and Colombia, as well as 
neighbouring countries such as Peru. Bolivia is not a significant exporter of manufactured goods 
but, because of changes in the terms of trade for commodities in recent years, Bolivia’s can be 
seen to have improved.
2  
 
Figure 16: Bolivia – terms of trade, 1990-2008 
 
Note: Calculated based on net barter terms of trade, defined as the ratio of the export unit value index to the 
import unit value index. 
Source: UNCTAD (2009). 
 
Although Bolivia was not totally immune to the global financial crisis, its major commodity exports 
such as natural gas and zinc experienced dramatic price increases in 2008, making price levels 
still high relative to 2006 even after subsequent declines by the latter quarter of 2008 (see Annex). 
Total exports decreased from $6.8 billion in 2008 to $5.3 billion in 2009, which is still higher than in 
2007  and  much  higher  than  at  the  beginning of  the decade.  The  composition  of exports  has 
changed during the decade, with hydrocarbons gaining the lion’s share in total exports from 29% in 
2003 to 50% in 2008 and 39% in 2009, owing to both price and quantity increases in natural gas 
                                                 


























exports  (Figure  17).  Conversely,  agro-industry’s  and  manufacturing’s  share  in  total  exports 
diminished  from  36.9%  in  2003  to  16.6%  in  2008  and  24%  in  2009.  Agro-industry  and 
manufacturing exports basically comprise soya and soya products, wood and wood manufacturing, 
textiles, Brazil nuts and sugar, among others. Mining has steadily increased its share, from 21.9% 
in 2003 to 27.8% in 2008 to 33.9% in 2009. If we filter out the effects of prices, exports have 
actually increased in volume for all three macro sectors in almost each year of the decade except 
for hydrocarbons, which have declined somewhat since 2006. This is mainly because the country 
reached full capacity in hydrocarbon production in 2006 and because of lower demand by Brazil in 
2009.  
 
The  relatively  good  performance  of  non-traditional  exports  (NTEs)  (i.e.  agriculture  and 
manufacturing) and mining is good news in terms of employment and income generation, as these 
sectors are the largest employers among the export sectors. The good performance of NTEs is 
especially remarkable given the Dutch disease type effects brought about by the natural resources 
export boom experienced by Bolivia in recent years.
3 In fact, NTEs are the largest export sectors in 
real terms and have grown substantially , even in 2009. This suggests that Bolivian exporters of 
NTEs have achieved a remarkable level of international competitiveness. This is further confirmed 
by the sector’s relative resilience to the loss of one of its main preferential market access in 2008, 
the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) to the US (as shown below). 
 
Figure 17: Bolivia’s export composition 
  
 
3.1.1  Export diversification  
Interpreting  the  export  diversification  index  calculated  by  the  UN  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development (2009) for Bolivia is difficult because of the impact that the global commodity price 
increases may have had. One can see that, by 2006, Bolivia’s export diversification index had 
fallen,  while  at  the  same  time export  concentration  was  increasing fairly  sharply  (Figure  17).
4 
Recent exchange  rate  developments  may  help to explain  some of these  developments:  when 
commodity prices rise, those countries with a high dependence tend to experience an exchange 
rate appreciation that can make other exports less competitive.  
 
                                                 
3 For example the national currency Boliviano has appreciated vis-à-vis the Dollar by 15% in 2008-09. 
4 See also Figure 5 Annex which has been calculated on the basis of a count of products and destination markets for 
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Figure 18: Bolivia’s export diversification 
 
Note: Number of products exported at the three-digit SITC, Rev. 2 level; this figure includes only those 
products that are greater than $100,000 or more than 0.3% of the country’s total exports. However, no base 
year is given for the indices.  
Source: UNCTAD (2009). 
 
On the import side, Brazil is Bolivia’s main trading partner, followed by Argentina, the US, Japan 
and  the  European  Union  (EU).  The fastest  growing  import  in  recent  years  has  been  vehicles 
(predominantly supplied by Japan). But energy-related categories comprise the largest in value 
terms, such as ‘nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc’, on which the US is the largest supplier. 
Bolivia is a net fuel importer. Venezuela is Bolivia’s largest supplier of ‘mineral oils, distillation 
products etc’.  
 
3.1.2  Trade policy and context  
Bolivia faces 0% tariffs (most favoured nation (MFN)) for its most important export in the Brazilian 
market. As can be seen from Table 2, the most restrictive market for Bolivia is the US: only around 
90% of products destined for the US are eligible for duty free treatment,
5 compared with almost 
100% in the Korean, Japanese and EU markets. However, although South Korea may appear less 
restrictive at the aggregate level than the US, it is more restrictive for agricultural products.  
 
Table 2: Market access in Bolivia’s main markets  
  Korea 
Rep. 
USA  EU  Japan 
Bolivia share of market’s total import value (%)  0.2  0.03  n/a  0.1 
All products:         
Value of Bolivia’s exports (US$ mn)  495  410  482  303 
Share of value for which simple AV tariff known (%)
 b  100  69.3  95.6  99.4 
Share in value of non-arms exports (for which simple AV 
tariff known) of products eligible for duty-free entry (%) 
c  99.4  88.8  99.2  99.5 
Simple average tariff (%)
 d  44.1  4.6  0.1  5.2 
Trade-weighted average tariff (%)
d  1.7  0.6  0.02  0.04 
Agricultural products:         
Value of Bolivia’s exports (US$ mn)  1  53  125  11 
Share of value for which simple AV tariff known (%)
 b  100  92.8  83.1  86.2 
Simple average tariff (%)
d  319  1.0  0  6.6 
Trade-weighted average tariff (%)
d  627.6  0.6  0  0.3 
Textile and clothing products:         
Value of Bolivia’s exports (US$ mn)  0.25  7  7  0.6 
Share of value for which simple AV tariff known (%)
 b  100  95.9  100  100 
Simple average tariff (%)
d  13  13.2  0.1  7.6 
Trade-weighted average tariff (%)
d  13  17.7  0.7  10.4 
                                                 
5 However, as noted in Table 1, goods accounting for more than 30% of US imports from Bolivia are not known.  17 
  Korea 
Rep. 
USA  EU  Japan 
Notes: 
(a)  i.e. items actually exported by Bolivia to the market shown in 2009.  
(b) For some markets not all applicable duties are known because a specific or compound duty applies (for 
which ad valorem equivalents have not been calculated). The share of the total value of imports of 
goods to which simple ad valorem tariffs apply and are known is shown here – and it is only the exports 
accounting for the total representing this share that have been included in the average tariff calculations 
in this table. 
(c)  Because the trade data are at the 6-digit level of the HS and tariffs are set at the more disaggregated 
national tariff line level, in many cases a range of tariffs applies to different items within an HS 6-digit 
sub-heading. In calculating this share the maximum rate applicable to any item within the 6-digit sub-
heading has been used. The proportion of trade eligible for duty-free entry shown here may, therefore, 
be understated.  
(d) Again, maximum tariff rates (preferential wherever applicable) have been used in these calculations.  
Sources: Calculated from trade data obtained from ITC Trade Map and the latest tariff schedules available 
in UNCTAD’s TRAINS database (2008 for EU; 2009 for Japan, Korea Rep. and USA). 
 
Table 3 presents applicable preferential regimes for Bolivia; Table 4 shows Bolivia’s membership 
of  other  regional  trade  agreements  (RTAs).  At  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO),  Bolivia 
negotiates within the following groups: Bolivia is a member of the following  negotiating groups: 
Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) – agriculture; Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) – 
non-agricultural market access (NAMA); Cairns Group; Tropical Products; G20; and G33. 
 
Table 3: Applicable preferential regimes for Bolivia  
Market  Applicable preferential regime(s) 
Brazil  MERCOSUR Associate Status 
Korea  Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) 
Argentina  Various (see Table 1.2). 
USA  GSP (ATPDEA until 2008) 
EU  GSP+, GSP 
Japan  GSP 
 
Table 4: Bolivia’s membership of other RTAs 
CAN Andean Community   Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela. 
GSTP General System of 
Trade Preferences among 
Developing Countries 
Algeria Argentina Bangladesh Benin Bolivia Brazil Cameroon Chile 
Colombia Cuba Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ecuador Egypt 
Ghana Guinea Guyana India Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran Iraq 
Libya Malaysia Mexico Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Nicaragua 
Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Republic of Korea Romania Singapore 
Sri Lanka Sudan Thailand Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia United Republic 
of Tanzania Venezuela Vietnam Yugoslavia Zimbabwe. 
Latin American Integration 
Association (LAIA) 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Cuba Ecuador Mexico Paraguay 
Peru Uruguay Venezuela. 
MERCOSUR  Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay. Associated countries: Chile and Bolivia. 
 
A recent study undertaken by Bouët et al. (2010) explored a number of scenarios related to Doha 
outcomes within a general equilibrium framework. Simulation results for the completion of the Doha 
Development Round (DDR) suggests that Bolivia will suffer preference erosion vis-à-vis other least 
development countries (LDCs) should full duty-free quota-free (DFQF) market access be granted 
under the DDR (see Table 5). Only in simulations where LDCs plus other small poor countries are 
granted DFQF is Bolivia estimated to gain (see Table 6). 
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Table 5: Percentage change in key variables in 2020 from OECD implantation of 100% DFQF 
for LDCs for other developing countries  
Other developing Countries   Exports  Welfare 
Mauritius  0.03  0.02 
Central America  0.14  0.01 
South Africa  0.02  0.00 
Rest of Asia and Oceania  0.00  0.00 
Middle East and North Africa  0.01  0.00 
Nigeria  0.01  0.00 
Rest of Eastern Europe  0.00  0.00 
Sri Lanka  -0.01  0.00 
China  -0.03  0.00 
India  -0.01  0.00 
Pakistan  -0.04  0.00 
Philippines  -0.01  0.00 
Vietnam  -0.01  -0.01 
Brazil  -0.03  -0.01 
Bolivia  -0.03  -0.01 
Indonesia  -0.03  -0.01 
Rest of Latin America  -0.05  -0.01 
Paraguay  -0.04  -0.03 
Source: Bouët et al. (2010) 
 





OECD for LDCs 
plus small LICs 
OECD for LDCs 
plus all LICs 
LDCs plus other 
small poor 
Bolivia  -0.03  -0.04  -0.02  3.46 
Source: Bouët et al. (2010) 
 
It is important to point out that general equilibrium models rely on a number of assumptions as to 
how economies work. Moreover, estimates are unable to take into account supply-side constraints; 
they also assume that demand responds positively to increases in supply. The potential benefits 
for producers from the removal of tariffs also depend on the nature of the value chain within which 
they trade (see Box 2).  
 










Source: Adapted from Stevens et al. (2008). 
 
There have not been any major changes in access to the main markets for Bolivian exports in the 
past decade, except the end of the preferential access to the US market granted through ATPDEA, 
which  was  terminated  in  2008  following  a  political  dispute  between  the  US  and  Bolivia.  This 
programme provided tariff-free quota-free access to US markets for three important Bolivian NTEs, 
  The first and most immediate impact would be the transfer of import taxes, formerly levied by more developed trade 
partners to respective supply chains. If this accrues to producers and exporters, it will make exports more profitable. 
  Second, if part of the revenue transfer accrues to importers, it could induce them to buy more from  LDC suppliers, 
leading to an increase in exports. If it accrues to producers/exporters, it may also enable LDC suppliers to increase 
their supply of competitive products without substantial new investment.  
  Third, by removing tariff barriers, DFQF may make it commercially feasible, for LDC suppliers to export new markets 
where these exports were previously constrained.  
  The fourth effect could be greatest, but is hardest to predict. If DFQF means increased supply from LDCs, there could 
be increases in foreign exchange earning and knock-on effects for the rest of the economy. 19 
i.e. wood-related products, jewellery and textiles. While these do not represent large export sectors 
in terms of value for Bolivia, they are labour intensive and provide livelihoods for many relatively 
poor workers. However, the end of this preferential access does not seem to have caused any 
important  changes  in  exports  to  the  US.  For  example,  the  decline  in  wood-related  exports 
experienced in 2009 was lower than that in 2008 for the US and lower than that of all the other 
major markets (see Figure 19). A similar picture emerges with respect to the other main products 
potentially affected by the end of APTDEA.  
 
Figure 19: Exports of wood, 2000-2009 
 
 
On the import side, most recent data suggest that tariff revenues make up around 7.2% of national 
tax revenue.
6 In relation to non-tariff barriers, Bolivia’s most recent Trade Policy Review (TPR), 
undertaken in 2005, does not mention any immediate difficulties in relation to either imports or 
exports.  
 
3.1.3  Aid for Trade 
Most AfT resources have been directed towards Bolivia’s productive sectors; more specifically, 
‘agriculture, forestry and fishing’, followed by ‘industry, mining and construction’. The proportion 
destined for ‘trade policy, admin and management’ has remained fairly stable over time. Shares 
destined for tourism, and the policy and administration associated with it, have been increasing 
over time (see Table 7). As shown by Table 8, in 2008 AfT allocated to Bolivia as a proportion of 
total trade as well as in absolute terms was the lowest since 2000. 
 
Table 7: Aid for Trade destined for Bolivia (constant US$ millions 2008) 
 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
33110: Trade policy and admin. 
management   3.97  1.80  10.36  0.12  0.68  2.40  0.18  3.17  2.86 
33120: Trade facilitation  
0.00  0.00  0.00  4.61  0.13  0.00  0.90  0.00  0.00 
33130: Regional trade agreements  
0.00  0.00  1.81  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
33140: Multilateral trade 
negotiations   0.00  0.03  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
33150: Trade-related adjustment 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
                                                 

































Brazil US UE Other countries20 
33181: Trade education/training 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.81  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 
33210: Tourism policy and admin. 
management   0.06  0.04  15.11  0.76  2.01  1.33  0.87  0.81  1.64 
200: II. ECONOMIC INFRA AND 
SERVICES  44.70  29.17  138.93  248.18  72.56  58.81  12.89  166.51  21.65 
300: III. PRODUCTION SECTORS 
147.68  39.02  119.52  141.70  116.32  138.43  117.10  131.54  60.90 
310: III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing  129.67  34.00  68.20  127.97  99.13  123.80  95.48  105.00  42.98 
320: III.2. Industry, Mining, 
Construction  13.98  3.16  23.97  8.23  13.56  10.90  19.68  22.56  13.38 
331: III.3.a. Trade Policies & 
Regulations  3.97  1.83  12.24  4.73  1.62  2.40  1.08  3.17  2.90 
332: III.3.b. Tourism 
0.06  0.04  15.11  0.76  2.01  1.33  0.87  0.81  1.64 
Source: OECD. 
 
Table 8: AfT and total exports (US$ ’000s) 
  
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Total AfT (USD$'000)  344.09  109.08  405.30  537.07  308.83  339.40  249.04  433.56  147.99 
Total Exports 
(USD$'000)  1,353  1,372  1,651  2,254  2,797  4,223  4,813  6,899  5,297 
Aft as % of total exports   25.4  8.0  24.5  23.8  11.0  8.0  5.2  6.3  2.8 
 
We next analyse the extent to which the AfT received by Bolivia is consistent with its trade-related 
priorities as emerging from the most recent OECD questionnaire on AfT (2009). In order to make 
the link we analyse specialisation index of different types of AfT. As described in  Section 3.3 
below, this measures the extent to which a country is receiving more ODA in that sector (within the 
broader AfT sector) relative to the other developing countries. In particular, an index greater than 1 
indicates a relative specialisation in the specific AfT sector controlling for the overall specialisation 
in AfT, i.e. a measure of the allocation of AfT across sub-sectors, and vice-versa. We also compute 
the specialisation index for AfT to measure to what extent AfT has been prioritised in total ODA to 
the country. 
 
Despite the country’s stated prioritisation of trade as a tool for development, AfT to Bolivia has 
been  rarely  prioritised  relative  to  other  ODA between  2000 and  2008  (Table  9).  And  the  AfT 
specialisation index was particularly low in 2008, suggesting that AfT was far from being a priority 
of  ODA  to  Bolivia.  On  the  other  hand,  there  seems  to  be  an  assonance  between  the  stated 
priorities of Bolivia and the sectoral allocation of AfT to Bolivia. AfT has been skewed towards aid 
to  productive  sectors  (particularly  agriculture,  industry and  mining and  more  recently  tourism), 
which is consistent with the fact that two of the three top trade-related priority areas of Bolivia are 
related to building productive capacity. 
 
Table 9: AfT specialisation index in Bolivia (based on 2008 US$ constant commitments)  
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
33110: Trade policy and 
management                                           1.8  1.6  1.1  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.0  0.7  2.0 
33120: Trade facilitation                                                           0.0  0.0  0.0  4.8  0.2  0.0  1.5  0.0  0.0 
33130: RTAs  0.0  0.0  3.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
33140: Multilateral trade 
negotiations                                                0.1  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
33150: Trade-related adj.                0.0  0.0 
33181: Trade education    0.0  0.0  0.0  11.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.4 
33210: Tourism policy                              0.1  0.2  25.3  0.4  4.0  1.0  0.4  1.1  12.9 
200: II. Econ Infra  0.3  0.6  0.8  1.0  0.6  0.5  0.2  0.8  0.4 
300: III. PROD Sectors  2.3  1.7  1.3  1.0  1.9  2.1  2.6  1.4  2.6 
310: III.1. Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fishing  3.0  2.1  1.2  1.4  2.9  3.0  3.6  1.5  2.7 21 
320: III.2. Industry, Mining, 
Construction  0.8  0.6  0.9  0.2  0.7  0.6  1.9  1.5  2.5 
331: III.3.a. Trade Policies & 
Regulations  1.7  1.0  1.2  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.4  1.1 
332: III.3.b. Tourism  0.1  0.2  25.3  0.4  4.0  1.0  0.4  1.1  12.9 
Total AfT (broad)  0.6  0.2  0.8  1.5  0.6  1.4  0.9  1.5  0.5 
Source: OECD CRS database. 
 
The questionnaire further suggests that AfT is not always coordinated, and that is less so when it 
comes to monitoring and evaluation activities, which are rarely carried out jointly by donors. 
 
3.2  Debt sustainability 
 
One of the six targets of Goal 8 is to ‘Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing 
countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long 
term’. 
 
Debt sustainability is a key issue for developing countries, since the burden of debt may become a 
serious threat to achieving the MDGs. The assessment of debt sustainability is a very sensitive 
issue and it encompasses two main aspects: solvency and liquidity. Solvency can be defined as a 
country’s  ability  to  discharge  its  future  external  debt-servicing  obligations  without  indefinitely 
accumulating debt. Liquidity is the ability of an economy to fully meet its current debt-servicing 
obligations.  
 
In what follows, we analyse the trends in the level and composition of debt in Bolivia over the 
period 2000-2008, and we also provide some more recent information on debt for 2009 and 2010 
where data were available. Then we assess the country’s debt sustainability over the same years 
by looking at a number of standard solvency and liquidity indicators. Afterwards, on the basis of the 
latest available IMF/World Bank’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA), we assess the risk of debt 
distress in Bolivia by looking at the projected debt and debt service dynamics in the next 20 years 
under a baseline scenario and in the face of plausible shocks. 
 
3.2.1  Debt level and composition 
The level of external debt in Bolivia experienced a downward trend over the period 2000-2008, 
owing to different debt relief strategies that benefited the country, such as the  Heavily Indebted 
Poor  Countries  (HIPC)  Initiative  (bilateral  debt)  and  the  G8  initiatives  (multilateral  debt).  The 
external debt stock as a share of GDP came down to 31% in 2008, from about 84% in 2003 
(Figure 20).  
 
Figure 20: External debt stocks, 2000-2009 (% of GDP) 
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The lessening of the debt burden over the period of analysis is also confirmed by the external debt 
to exports  ratio. As shown in Figure 21, external debt as a share of exports of goods and services 
experienced a sharp decline, going down from 303% in 2000 to 35% in 2008. This sharp decrease 
owed not only to the reduction in the stock of debt, but also to the significant increase occurred in 
total exports as a result of the export commodity boom witnessed since 2006. 
 
Figure 21: External debt stocks, 2000-2009 (% of exports of goods and services) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia, and authors’ elaborations.  
 
In 2009, because of the adverse effects of the global financial crisis, both the external debt to GDP 
ratio and the external debt to exports ratio increased to 32% and 48,% respectively (Figures 20 
and 21). The debt burden appeared still reduced compared to its values in early 2000s, however. 
 
As shown in Figure 22, significant debt forgiveness and reduction occurred in 2001 under the HIPC 
Initiative, and in 2006 and 2007 under the G8 initiative. 
 
Figure 22: Debt forgiveness or reduction, 2000-2009 (US$ millions) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
 
Total  public  sector  debt  has  dropped  significantly  over  recent  years  thanks  to  strong  fiscal 
performance and the multilateral debt relief initiative (MDRI). As shown in Figure 23, gross public 
debt fell by about 50 percentage points of GDP between 2005 and 2008, when it reached a value 
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Figure 23: Total gross and net public debt, 2005-2010 (% of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF’s 2009 Article IV Consultation and DSA, and authors’ elaborations. 
 
In 2009, lower GDP growth because of the global recession is expected to make total gross public 
debt increase temporarily to 39% of GDP before going down to 37% in 2010. Total net public debt 
is projected to experience a gradual downward trend up to 2010.  
 
Domestic debt as a share of GDP declined from 21.7% in 2005 to 16.7% in 2008, but a slight 
increase to 17.3% occurred in 2009 (Figure 24). 
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In terms of composition, it is worth looking at: 1) the share of public sector debt; 2) concessional 
debt; 3) foreign debt; and 4) short-term debt. Some of these indicators may also help assess the 
vulnerability of the economy to solvency and liquidity risk arising from the external debt position. 
 
Public  sector  debt  represents  the  largest  share  of  external  debt  throughout  all  the  period  of 
analysis. However, after a slight increase, it progressively decreased from 73% in 2004 to 43% in 
2008 (Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25: Public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt (% of total external debt 
stocks) 
 
Source: World Bank’s GDF. 
 
On the other hand, if we look at the share of concessional debt in total external debt we can see 
that it has experienced a downward trend, going down to  59.9%  in 2007 from  92.9%  in 2000 
(Figure 26), owing to the fact that most of the debt relief involved concessional debt only. However, 
the ratio picked up slightly during 2008 before coming back to its previous value in 2009.  
 
Figure 26: Concessional debt, 2000-2009 (% of total external debt) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia.  
 
If we look at the currency composition of debt, we can see that Bolivia’s foreign external debt is 
dominated by US dollars. Indeed, as shown in Figure 27, in 2008 a share of 80% of PPG external 
debt was payable in US dollars. Such a high share of foreign debt might represent an important 
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Concessional Debt (% of total external debt)25 
currency.  Nevertheless,  so  far  Bolivia’s  domestic  currency  (bolivianos)  has  appreciated 
continuously  during  the  past  years,  backed  by  strong  commodities  exports  and  favourable 
international demand, going from 8.1 bolivianos per US dollar in 2005 to 7.07 bolivianos per US 
dollar in 2008. 
 
Figure 27: Currency composition of PPG external debt, 2008 (%) 
 
Source: World Bank’s GDF. 
 
The foreign currency exposure of domestic debt reduced between 2005 and 2008. This as well as 
an extension of maturities has significantly reduced domestic debt vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure 28: Domestic debt maturity and composition, 2005-2008 
 
Source: IMF’s 2009 Article IV Consultation. 
 
If we look at the maturity composition of debt, in Bolivia the share of short-term debt has decreased 
over the past years. Indeed, the ratio of short-term debt to total external debt decreased from 8% in 
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Figure 29: Short-term debt (% total external debt), 2000-2008 
 
Source: World Bank’s GDF. 
 
Table 10: Composition of the debt according to the creditors (US$ millions) 
 
 
The  significant  debt  reductions  Bolivia  has  benefited  from  in  recent  years  have  considerably 
reduced  the  debt  service  burden.  In  2009,  the  effective  debt  service  of  concessional  debt 











2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
%
Short-term debt / total external debt
2000 2004 2009 2009
(% of Total Debt)
MULTILATERAL 3,077.4 4,661.9 2,246.4 79.2
     IMF 220.2 306.0 256.4 9.0
     WORLD BANK 1,096.1 1,748.6 315.3 11.1
     IDB 1,392.8 1,658.2 516.9 18.2
     CAF 255.4 836.9 1,020.0 35.9
     FIDA 36.7 43.5 46.0 1.6
     FONPLATA 49.9 32.9 32.7 1.2
     OTHERS 26.3 35.8 59.1 2.1
BILATERAL 1,364.3 382.9 591.5 20.8
     JAPAN 523.4 71.6 0.0 0.0
     GERMANY 325.4 39.1 58.4 2.1
     SPAIN 134.9 142.8 19.3 0.7
     ITALY 67.0 9.8 8.9 0.3
     FRANCE 40.7 17.2 9.1 0.3
     UNITED STATES 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
     BELGIUM 57.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
     UNITED KINGDOM 18.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
     NETHERLANDS 12.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
     AUSTRIA 63.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
     BRAZIL 0.0 87.4 101.4 3.6
     CHINA 0.0 14.0 79.5 2.8
     CANADA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
     VENEZUELA 0.0 0.0 287.5 10.1
     SOUTH KOREA 0.0 1.0 20.4 0.7
     ARGENTINA 0.0 0.0 7.0 0.2
     OTHERS 61.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
PRIVATE 18.8 0.4 0.0 0.0
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT 4,460.5 5,045.2 2,837.9 100.027 
amortisations. The stock of concessional debt outstanding at the end of 2009 was $1.5 billion, 
which is expected to generate a debt burden of approximately $120 million (8% of the stock of 
debt). Thus, future additional debt relief initiatives would imply a debt service burden relief of a 
magnitude proportional to the share of the stock of debt that is relieved. 
 
In 2009, Bolivia’s total external debt amounted to $ 2.8 billion. Of Bolivia’s external debt, 79% is 
with multilateral organisations, of which 35.9% is owed to the Andean Development Corporation 
(CAF), which lends to the country at commercial rates. The external debt owed to the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has reduced substantially in recent years, owing 
to the G8 debt relief initiative. These agencies now account for 11.1% and 18.2%, respectively, of 
Bolivia’s total external public debt (Table 10).  
 
The rest of the external debt (20.8%) is owed to bilateral creditors, the most important of which is 
that owed to Venezuela, which accounts for 10.1% of the total debt. The importance of Venezuela 
as Bolivia’s bilateral creditor has increased substantially in recent years. 
 
3.2.2  Debt sustainability 
In the period 2000-2009, the key solvency indicators for Bolivia remained below the debt burden 
thresholds over the majority of the period highlighting that public debt and external debt have been 
sustainable. Bolivia is classified as ‘medium performer’ on the basis of the quality of its policies and 
institutions as measured by the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), 
and relevant thresholds are set to be: 150% for the net present value (NPV) of debt to exports 
ratio, 250% for the NPV of debt to revenue ratio, 20% for the debt service to exports ratio and 30% 
for the debt service-to-revenue ratio. 
  
The external debt service to exports ratio has dropped drastically since 2000, going from 18.2% to 
3.8% in 2008, thus remaining constantly well below the threshold level of 20%(Figure 30). In 2009, 
it increased to 4.2% but it still remained manageable. 
 
Figure 30: External debt service (% of exports of goods and services), 2000-2009 
 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
 
Table  11  reports  the  different  levels  of  spending  that  the  government  undertakes  for  health, 
education  and  to  meet  its  debt  obligations.  It  emerges  that  Bolivia  spends  roughly  the  same 
amount to pay health services and its debt (around 3% of GDP), although its debt obligations have 













2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Debt Service (% of Exports of Goods and Services)28 






External debt service 
(% GDP) 
2000     5.47  2.89 
2001     5.90  2.81 
2002     6.23  2.57 
2003  3.71  6.38  3.26 
2004  3.82     3.11 
2005  3.81     3.11 
2006  3.54  6.31  3.17 
2007  3.44     2.21 
2008        3.06 
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators GDF. 
 
The external debt service to revenue ratio declined from 14.1% in 2004 to 4.8% in 2008 and further 
to 4% in 2009 (Figure 31). 
 
Figure 31: External debt service (% of fiscal revenues), 2000-2009 
 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia, UDAPE and authors’ elaborations. 
 
The NPV of external debt to exports ratio and the NPV of external debt in percent of GNI remained 
manageable. In 2008, the NPV of external debt to exports ratio was equal to 29.4%, well below the 
150% indicative threshold level, while the NPV of external debt in percent of GNI amounted to 
14.1%,  also  below  the  40%  threshold.  The  NPV  of  external  debt  in  percent  of  government 
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Figure 32: NPV of external debt (% of fiscal revenues), 2000-2009 
 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia, UDAPE and authors’ elaborations. 
 
In 2009, both the NPV of debt to exports ratio and the NPV of debt to revenue ratio increased to 
46% and 44%, respectively, owing to the adverse impact of the global recession on exports and 
the  fiscal  position,  but  they  were  still  significantly  below  their  indicative  thresholds.  The 
sustainability of debt in Bolivia in 2009 notwithstanding the crisis is confirmed by the NPV of debt to 
GDP ratio, which remained below its threshold at a level of 14%.  
 
Further evidence of an improvement in debt sustainability over time is highlighted by a declining 
trend in the interest service ratio, which went from 6.5% in 2000 to 1.3% in 2009 (Figure 33). 
 
Figure 33: Interest payments on external debt (% of exports of goods and services), 2000-
2009 
 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
 
If we look at public debt, the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) of December 2009 reports 
that in 2008 both the debt service to revenue ratio and the NPV of public debt to revenue ratio 
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Figure 34: Public sector debt to government revenue ratios (%), 2006-2008  
 
Source: IMF’s 2009 Article IV Consultation and authors’ elaborations. 
 
Additional evidence comes from the liquidity situation in Bolivia during the period 2000-2008, when 
the ratio of international reserves to short-term debt, which is the single most important liquidity 
indicator, increased dramatically from 294% in 2000 to 4950% in 2008 (Figure 35). This trend was 
propelled  by  the  windfalls  generated  by  the  commodities’  price  boom  previous  to  the  global 
economic  downturn,  which  reinforced  the  country’s  reserve  adequacy  over  the  past  couple  of 
years. 
 
Figure 35: Ratio of international reserves to short-term debt, 2000-2008 (%) 
 
Source: World Bank’s GDF. 
 
Finally, in order to assess the vulnerability of the economy to solvency and liquidity risks arising 
from the external debt position, it is also worth looking at the trends over time of different balance 
of  payments  (BOP) flows.  Figure  36  reports  the  trends  of foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  and 
remittances in Bolivia. On the one hand, remittances experienced a steady upward trend up to 
2008,  albeit  with  a  relative  modest  drawback  of flows  between  2007  and  2008.  In  any  case, 
remittances continue contributing to enhance the country’s ability to meet its debt obligations. On 
the other hand, FDI dropped continuously from 2000 until 2005; it then started recovering again, 
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Figure 36: BOP flows, 2000-2008 (US$) 
 
Source: World Bank’s GDF. 
 
Box 3: Debt stress tests 
In the latest DSA of December 2009, the IMF/World Bank conducted a series of stress tests to evaluate 
Bolivia’s risk of debt distress over the next 20 years. The simulation exercise involved projecting debt trends 
as a response to a series of shocks (i.e. changes in GDP and export growth, external inflation and debt 
concessionality).  
 
The main underlying macroeconomic assumptions for the baseline scenario are the following: 
  Real GDP growth is expected to slightly increase averaging about 4% over the next 20 years. 
  The average deflator inflation is expected to decline gradually to 3.5% in the long run. 
  Export and import growth are projected to remain below their historical average in the medium and long 
term. 
  Despite the overall balanced fiscal position, net external financing flows are expected to remain positive 
in the medium term. 
  The average concessionality of the public sector borrowing is projected to grow in the medium term. 
 
PV of debt-to-exports                     PV of debt-to-revenue 
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-----Baseline ----Shock - - - Threshold 
 
Note: The shocks used vary among graphs. In the first figure, the shock corresponds to a terms shock; in the 
second to a one-time depreciation shock; in the third to an exports shock; and in the fourth to a one-time 
depreciation shock. 
Source: IMF DSA-BOLIVIA (2009) and authors’ elaborations.  
 
In  general,  results  suggest  that  Bolivia’s  risk  of  debt  distress  is  low  since  debt  sustainability  indicators 
present  sufficient  margins  with  respect  to  their  indicative  thresholds  (see  figures  above).  Nevertheless, 
simulations show that debt sustainability indicators could deteriorate under various standard stress tests, but 
still remaining manageable over the medium and long term. Debt service is expected to remain low as a 
consequence of the long maturities of remaining stocks of domestic and foreign debt.  
   
3.3   Aid analysis 
 
Box 4: Commitments vs. disbursements  
We mainly use ODA commitments rather than disbursement for the analysis of ODA as the former have 
better  ODA  coverage  than  the  latter  in  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD) Creditor Reporting Statistic (CRS) dataset, which is our main source of data. This is especially the 
case for pre-2002 data, where the coverage of disbursements is not sufficient to have reliable data (and this 
is the reason why OECD CRS data on disbursement are readily available online only from 2002). The use of 
commitments data should not bias the analysis as commitments are a powerful predictor of disbursements, 
and this is the case also for our sample of four countries (Bolivia, Bangladesh, Cambodia and Uganda). We 
do  this  by  running  a  panel  data  regression  fort  the  four  countries  over  the  period  2002-2008  with 
disbursement as the dependent variable and commitment lagged two years as the regressor (plus country 
dummies). The coefficient of commitment was not significantly different from one. Moreover, allocation of 
commitments across sectors and donors in recipient countries mirrors closely that of disbursements. Keeping 
that in mind, we will also show some of the results using disbursements data as well. 
 
Bolivia has historically been relatively dependent on ODA both to fund its public expenditure and to 
execute social and economic projects. At the beginning of this decade, ODA commitments were 
almost $1.5 billion per year (Figure 37). However, the boost in public revenues, especially related 
to hydrocarbon production, the phasing down of the reduction in external debt (see above) and a 
new more horizontal relationship between the government and the donor community (Rodriguez 
Carmona,  2009)  have  contributed  to  somewhat  reducing  the  dependence  of  the  country  on 
external aid. This is visible in the decline in the absolute value of commitments after 2004 (the 
peak in disbursement in 2006 owes to previous commitments coming on stream), which were close 
to $500 million in 2008. This pattern is even clearer in the case of the share of ODA in GNI, which 
fell abruptly from 14% in 2004 to less than 4% in 2008 (Figure 38). This certainly owes to the rapid 




                                                 
7 An exception is Venezuela and to some extent Brazil, which according to our interviews have rapidly scaled up their aid 
programmes in Bolivia in the last few years. However these figures are not included in the OECD CRS figures we use, 
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Figure 37: ODA flow to Bolivia (constant 2008 US$ million) 
 
 
Figure 38: ODA per capita and as share of GNI, Bolivia 
 
 
Figure 39 and 40 provide further confirmation of this trend, as they show the decline in the share of 
Bolivia in total ODA as well as in total ODA to the low-middle income group of recipient countries in 
terms of both commitments and disbursements. 
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Figure 40: ODA share of Bolivia in LDCs (based on commitment const. 2008 US$ millions) 
  
 
Multilateral aid in Bolivia has always been a fairly minor part of total ODA (Figure  41), although 
both  multilateral  and  bilateral  aid  has  been  declining  in  recent  years.  As  such,  there  is  no 
multilateral institution among the top three donors to Bolivia over 2000-2008, in which period the 
US, Japan and Germany provided most bilateral ODA (Table 12). All major OECD donors have 
reduced their commitments to Bolivia in the past decade, with Spain the only exception, having 
steadily increased its commitments (now the second largest OECD donor).  
 
Figure 41: Bolivia: Bilateral vs. multilateral ODA 
Bilateral vs. multilateral aid (constant US$m)  Share of aid in total bilateral and multilateral aid  
   
 
Table 12: Bolivia’s major donors (constant 2008 US$ millions) 
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Total 
 
                          
  DAC bilateral  999  635  1,169  775  1,152  639  634  557  478  7,039 
US  300  132  216  298  195  177  232  182  121  1,854 
Japan  361  13  18  40  536  58  108  38  31  1,203 
Germany  111  69  608  88  57  32  51  68  68  1,151 
Netherlands  31  108  64  111  144  27  61  54  64  664 
Spain  49  56  59  94  70  57  60  72  91  609 
                             
  Multilateral  231  393  203  523  193  115  169  305  101  2,232 
IADB  132  175  46  301  37  38  64  137  22  953 
IDA  7  164  117  125  49  51  35  82  40  670 
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In line with the general tendency, bilateral ODA to Bolivia is increasingly untied. As of 2008, over 
three-quarters of bilateral ODA from OECD donors was untied, which makes an important change 
vis-à-vis the situation at the beginning of the decade, when the majority of ODA was tied. This may 
also be explained by the shift mentioned above from project-based support (which is more prone to 
be tied) to budget- and programme-based support, which has been materialising in recent years.  
 
Figure 42: Tied vs. untied aid, Bolivia (% of bilateral aid) 
 
 
3.3.1  Allocations across sectors 
We analyse the ODA allocation across sectors in two ways. First, we simply examine the sectoral 
composition of ODA, focusing on the macro sectors (i.e. 2-digit OECD CRS sectors) and on some 
3-digit level sectors that should be particularly relevant to reach some of the MDGs (e.g. education 
and  health  spending);  second,  we  compute  a  simple  index  of  relative  specialisation  for  those 
sectors. The index is the ratio of the share of country i in total ODA for a specific sector s and the 


















where  ODAis  and  ODAi  are  ODA  in  sector  s  (in  US$)  and  total  ODA  (in  US$)  for  country  i 
respectively, and n is the total number of donors. A value of the index greater than one indicates 
that country i is receiving more ODA in that sector relative to the other developing countries. 
 
The social sector has been the main recipient of ODA to Bolivia in  this  decade. The level of 
commitments to the sector has been declining, although less abruptly than for the other sectors, 
such  as  the  economic  sectors  (Table  13),  although  aid  to  productive  sectors  has  remained 
relatively high throughout the period (Table 14). Therefore, the specialisation index for the social 
sectors has been increasing in recent years (Table  14). It is difficult to establish why aid has 
become  more  pro-social  in  this  period  in  Bolivia.  One  hypothesis  that  emerges  from  our 
discussions is that,  given the rising leverage that the Bolivian government appears to have in 
recent  years  over  donors’  allocation  of  resources,  this  may  reflect  government  priorities  of 
increasing social spending.  
 
On the other hand, the importance of debt relief-type aid has been declining over time, consistent 
with what we noted above. From being one of the key forms of external support, debt-related aid 
has become unimportant in recent years with the end of the debt relief actions. 
 
It is worth noting that the budget support data do not reflect the actual evolution of ODA to Bolivia 
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OECD CRS definition of budget support does not include direct aid to the government earmarked 
for certain activities, which has been the most common form of aid to the national budget in Bolivia 
in recent years.  
 
Table 13: Allocation of commitments across sectors, Bolivia (constant 2008 US$ millions) 
  
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
All  1,230  1,028  1,372  1,298  1,346  754  803  861  579 
Social infra & services  522  602  351  551  435  378  473  425  360 
Education  48  63  43  99  146  101  49  64  55 
Basic Education  35  26  24  21  116  6  14  14  18 
Health  77  85  49  78  45  58  59  26  50 
Economic infra and services  45  29  139  248  73  59  13  167  22 
Production sectors  148  39  120  142  116  138  117  132  61 
Multisector / cross-cutting  58  81  66  99  89  51  50  86  68 
Commodity aid / general prog. 
Ass.  76  79  36  132  106  38  57  28  33 
General budget support  26  15  ..  43  56  ..  11  ..  6 
Action relating to debt  373  134  643  110  503  67  80  ..  3 
 
Table 14: Allocation of commitments across sectors, Bolivia (specialisation index) 
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Avg 
Social infra & services  1.17  1.66  0.74  1.24  0.77  1.44  1.55  1.12  1.56  1.25 
Education  0.49  0.76  0.37  0.91  1.13  2.20  0.76  0.85  1.29  0.97 
Basic Education  1.13  0.99  0.81  0.62  2.41  0.40  0.67  0.89  1.46  1.04 
Health  1.22  1.71  0.70  1.28  0.63  1.46  1.20  0.51  1.65  1.15 
Economic infra and services  0.22  0.15  0.66  1.49  0.32  0.62  0.13  1.24  0.20  0.56 
Production sectors  1.46  0.40  0.98  1.44  1.11  2.83  2.23  2.07  1.41  1.55 
Multisector / cross-cutting  0.56  0.99  0.61  1.01  1.08  1.16  0.99  1.42  1.64  1.05 
Commodity aid / general prog. 
Ass.  0.63  1.02  0.40  1.51  1.67  1.18  1.63  0.76  0.86  1.07 
General budget support  0.34  0.35 
 




0.21  0.57 
Action relating to debt  4.78  1.78  4.37  0.49  4.57  0.41  0.55     0.08  2.13 
 
3.3.2  Aid volatility 
 
Box 5: Measuring aid volatility  
Alternative methodologies are available to measure the volatility of aid. We use the most popular measure in 
the  literature  (see  e.g.  Bulir  and  Hamann  (2003),  Pallage  and  Robe  (2001),  Chauvet  and  Guillaumont 
(2009)), which is based on the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). The application of this 
filter allows extracting the trend and cycle components of any flow variable, ODA in this case. The H-P filter 
decomposes  a  series,  xt,  (where  xt  is  the  logarithm  of  the  observed  series  Xt)  in  a  cycle 
c
t x and  in  a 
trend
g
t x by minimising the following function: 
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t x x x   . We then define volatility as the share of the cycle 











  and  also  in  each  period 
t
c
t t x x /   .  A  higher  indicator  is  associated  with  higher  volatility  of  aid.  The  indicators  based  on 
commitments are likely to be more accurate than those based on disbursement data as the former is based 
on a longer time period (1995-2008 vs. 2002-2008) and on wider coverage of the data. 
 
Figure  43  presents  the  evolution  of  actual  ODA  commitments  vis-à-vis  its  trend  (calculated 
according to the method explained in Box 5) for the period 1995-2008. The volatility seems to be 
reducing over time as the trend line is closer to the observed commitments. This is confirmed in 
Figure 44, which plots the evolution of σt over the period.  
 
Figure 43: How volatile is aid? Actual commitment vs. trend 
 
 
Figure 44: Volatility over time of ODA commitments 
 
 
3.3.3  ODA and the Paris principles 
Aside  from  the  share  of  tied  aid  and  of  aid  volatility/predictability,  conformity  to  the  Paris 
Declaration principles of aid alignment, ownership and harmonisation represents another important 



























































1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 200838 
increasingly  clear  that  the  intention  of  the  government  to  be  in  the  driving  seat  of  the  ODA 
automobile. There are various pieces of evidence in support of this.  
 
First, the government has been increasingly (successfully) asking the donor community to provide 
funds through its  ministries so as to avoid duplication and  to  increase the alignment of donor 
interventions to national priorities. One immediate consequence of this has been the increase in 
the share of budget support-type aid and a reduction in project aid (Rodriguez Carmona, 2009).
8 
Another consequence is the recent creation of a working group of the major donors to coordinate 
the operations of the donor community in Bolivia. Moreover , there has been an evident decline in 
the use of conditionalities by donors. While this is consistent with a general trend in the aid 
industry, it is also the consequence of two factors  that have played a major role in Bolivia: the 
progressive end of the conditionalities attached to the debt forgiveness period (the bulk of HIPC II 
was implemented in 2001 -2002 in Bolivia);  and the diminished fiscal dependence of Bolivia on 
external aid (mainly as a result of the hydrocarbon-related fiscal resources boom). 
 
These features are obviously in line with an ODA provision respecting the principles of alignment, 
ownership and harmonisation and are therefore a welcome trend for the country. Whether this has 
been the consequence of a clear government vision or of a favourable international cont ext for 
Bolivia is less clear, but also less relevant in the context of this study.  
 
3.3.4  Effects of the crisis on aid and future perspectives 
As shown above,  aid to Bolivia has started to decline well  before  the beginning of the global 
financial crisis. As ODA by major crisis-affected economies had become already fairly small by the 
time of the crisis, there was less scope to operate major cuts on aid programmes to Bolivia. Central 
Bank estimates (IMF, 2010) indicate that that grants to Bolivia (part of total ODA) as a percentage 
of GDP declined in 2009 to 1.0%, from 1.2% in 2008. However, this is most probably a result of the 
continuation of a declining trend (e.g. the decrease from 2007 to 2008 was even more marked, i.e. 
1.6% to 1.2%) rather than to any crisis-related effect per se. 
 
This is confirmed by our fieldwork, which suggests no signs of cuts in aid programmes as a result 
of the effects of the crisis in the donors’ national budgets. To the best of our knowledge, the only 
known cases of important cuts in aid to Bolivia in 2009 are in Danish and US aid. However, our 
information  suggests  that  these  cuts  are  related  to  strategic  decisions  on  the  reallocation  of 
resources across countries (in the case of Danish aid) and to foreign policy issues (in the case of 
US aid) rather than to any crisis effects.  
 
Diminished dependence on aid is likely to continue in the following years as fiscal revenues are 
expected to stay relatively high (especially as natural gas-related revenues are fairly sure – unless 
the international price drops abruptly). However, existing donors are likely to continue to operate in 
the country and there is no indication that they will scale down their assistance significantly in the 
near  future.  Importantly,  non-traditional  donors  such  as  Brazil  and  especially  Venezuela  have 
signalled their intention to scale up assistance. In this context, the process of increased ownership, 
harmonisation and alignment may continue in the future. 
 
3.4  The shifting pattern of external dependence and the MDGs  
 
From the above analysis,  it is clear that the type of dependence of Bolivia on MDG  8-related 
external flows has changed radically during the decade. The composition of external finance  in 
public expenditure shifted from domination by ODA and debt forgiveness in the first half of the 
decade to  domination  by trade, mainly through revenues from hydrocarbon exports. Figure  45 
clearly shows this by plotting the evolution of the sum of ODA and the annual potential value of 
                                                 
8 Collecting hard figures on these shares has proven difficult, but all of the people interviewed concurred that there is an 
increase in the budgetisation of aid as well as a higher involvement of the government in leading the aid allocation. 39 
debt relief (computed as annual amortisations plus interest on external debt) against hydrocarbon-
related taxes (everything as a percentage of GDP). The bonanza of international prices of natural 
gas along with the introduction of the IDH – an additional tax of 32% on the value of natural gas 
production  –  in  2005  has  generated  a  drastic  increase  in  the  absolute  and  relative  value  of 
hydrocarbon-related  fiscal  revenues  during  the  decade.  On  the  other  hand,  the  debt  relief 
operations  of  the  beginning  of  the  decade  and  declining  ODA  flows  have  meant  reduced 
dependence on concessional flows. 
 
Figure 45: The shifting pattern of Bolivian dependence (share of GDP) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on IMF (2010) and Bolivian authorities’ data. 
 
This shift in the type of external dependence of Bolivia also implies a shift in its relations with the 
international community, including in its role in supporting Bolivia’s achievement of the MDGs. The 
chronic inability of the Bolivian government to raise its own resources and the persistent fiscal 
deficit it faced at the beginning of the decade meant that the international community played a 
crucial role in financing fiscal expenditure, especially social-related expenditure, which is directly 
related to the achievement of the MDGs. Perhaps the most emblematic sign of this influence was 
the conditionality imposed through the HIPC II operation in 2001-2002. The agreement implied that 
resources  liberated  through  debt  forgiveness  would  be  allocated  to  the  social  sector  and  this 
represented a consistent part of Bolivia’s social spending in those years. The change in conditions 
allowed the government to turn its chronic deficit into a fiscal surplus (also with the increase in 
revenues from indirect taxes linked to GDP growth), along with an important increase in social 
spending, mainly funded with own resources. As a consequence, the international community has 
played an increasingly less important role, especially as far as the provision of funds for MDG-
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4.  Partnerships (MDG 8) 
 
The  above  analysis  yields  a  number  of  implications  in  terms  of  the  potential  role  for  the 
international community in the  near future to support the achievement of  the  MDGs in Bolivia 
through the partnerships suggested by MDG 8.  
 
4.1  Additional international funding is not the priority  
 
The evidence presented in Sections 2 and 3 goes a long way to support the idea that the provision 
of additional financial resources may not be the priority with regard to organising support to the 
MDG  achievements.  First,  Bolivia  has  finally  been  able  to  generate  a  large  flow  of  financial 
resources to fund its social expenditure, mainly through direct taxation on an increasingly valuable 
hydrocarbon production, along with indirect taxation riding on healthy economic growth. This has 
been accompanied by an increasing government focus on the social sector, whose share in total 
public expenditure has steadily increased during the past decade (while ODA dependence has 
declined). At the same time, though, this increase in public spending does not always appear to 
have had the expected positive effect in terms of achievement of the MDGs, as is the case in 
education. We have put forth a number of possible reasons for this, such as diminishing returns to 
public expenditure, especially as the goal becomes closer (e.g. it is more difficult to bring the net 
enrolment  ratio from 80%  to  85%  than from 95%  to  100%)  and  the  inefficiency of  the public 
expenditure (for any given level of resources). In particular, the latter factor may constrain progress 
towards MDG achievement regardless of the level of resources available. 
 
Second, official projections suggest that Bolivia is on track to achieve most of the MDG targets 
(and it has already achieved some, such as those related to MDG 3). We have explained the 
reasons why these data are more optimistic than other data such, as those used by Vos et al. 
(2009),  according  to  which  Bolivia  is  off  track  on  most  of  the  MDGs.  It  is  also  clear  that the 
reliability  of  the  official  projections,  provided  by  ministries,  may  not  be  assured,  but  these 
projections are based on most information available.  
 
A third reason against additional resources is that the recent financial crisis has not caused any 
major changes in progress towards MDG achievement. That is because Bolivia showed resilience 
in facing the crisis, which has meant that feared negative impacts on the economy have not been 
generated, as argued above and more extensively by Jemio and Nina (2010). 
 
Fourth,  the  favourable  international  context  has  not  only  determined  a  massive  increase  in 
hydrocarbon exports, with associated virtuous fiscal effects, but has also spurred the growth of 
mineral exports, with associated positive effects on employment and income (particularly relevant 
for MDG 1).  
 
In  the  span  of  a  few  years,  Bolivia  has  thus  become  much  more  able  to  take  its  social  and 
economic destiny in its own hands, reducing the need to resort to the international community as 
mainly a donor community in a relation of vertical dependence. This is not to say that financial 
support by donors should keep declining or stop in the coming years. On the contrary, this support, 
especially in the form of grants, represents an important cushion against the eventual vagaries of 
international markets that may jeopardise Bolivia’s fiscal and economic resilience, and with this its 
progress towards the MDGs. This is especially the case if the horizontal collaboration between the 
donor community and the Bolivian government keeps being reinforced, avoiding duplications and 
increasing the alignment of donor and government priorities. 
 
In the same way, the policy option of debt forgiveness has lost some of the importance that it had 
at the beginning of the decade when fiscal resources were overstretched and the burden of debt in 41 
the economy was large. At present, the potential yearly value of the savings from debt forgiveness 
is estimated at around $120 million, which is a relatively low figure in today’s Bolivia. On the other 
hand, debt forgiveness is always a relatively easy option to convey additional funds to the country 
in case of need.  
 
4.2  Help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public policies 
 
In this context, an important role the donor community has to play in supporting Bolivian efforts 
towards MDG achievement lies in its provision of technical assistance. This is especially important 
inasmuch as Bolivia’s development partners can build on their experience in devising effective 
public policies and efficient systems of policy implementation. As noted above, these appear to be 
key areas in influencing the probability of Bolivia achieving the MDGs. Ineffective and/or inefficient 
public spending (for instance because it does not target the real needs of the population or does 
not deliver services efficiently) may  hinder achievement of the goals despite an abundance of 
public resources.  
 
There are increasing numbers of instances in which the donor community has provided this type of 
support to Bolivia, for example by promoting breakfast for children in schools (desayuno escolar). 
This experimentation was instrumental in devising a system now adopted by several municipalities 
in Bolivia, which is considered to be an important determinant in the progress towards the primary 
school completion target. By the same token, the financial and technical contribution by donors has 
been  key  in  the  recent  establishment  of  a  school  to  train  public  sector  officials,  whose  final 
objective is to improve the quality of public policies.  
 
4.3  Market access or access to markets? 
 
As highlighted in Section 3, trade has been a boon for Bolivia’s economy in recent years, but the 
role of market access through trade agreements has been limited in determining this bonanza. 
Proximity to Brazil and Argentina has allowed for hydrocarbon exports, and international prices of 
the main Bolivian exports, including natural gas and minerals, have produced the recent boom, so 
important in the country’s progress towards MDG achievement. The limited influence of preferential 
market access on Bolivian exports is further confirmed by the limited effects on NTEs of the end of 
the ATPDEA with the US. Bolivia already enjoys good market access in its main markets and it is 
thus not clear to what extent better access in terms of tariffs to international markets  would be 
beneficial.  
 
Given the importance of agricultural products in Bolivia’s NTEs, better access through lower non-
tariff barriers may be more relevant than improving access in terms of tariffs. This is the case 
particularly for certain exports, such as Brazil nuts, whose access to developed countries’ markets 
is often reduced by sanitary and phyto-sanitary barriers.  
 
Getting better access in those products could be linked to infrastructure investments,  such as 
enhancing  the  capacity  of  national  certification  agencies.  The  international  community  could 
support these types of investments, which lie at the core of the AfT initiative. Unfortunately, Bolivia 
has been receiving less trade-related assistance in the past few years (pretty much in line with the 
rest of the aid sectors), but this could be important to stimulate especially NTEs, which are key for 
employment and income generation. Similarly, investments in infrastructure, especially transport 
infrastructure,  are  still  a  key  part  of  enhancing  the  integration  of  Bolivia  into  regional  and 
international markets. The international community has been playing a role in this area, with a 
number of transport projects executed throughout the region. However, aid funds to these types of 
long-term investments are declining, although the government is currently able to scale up its 
transport infrastructure investments (although not as much as its social spending). In this sense, 42 
the  international  community  would probably  do  better to help  Bolivia  achieve better  access to 
markets (i.e. physical integration) rather than better market access (i.e. better tariff conditions). 
 
4.4  Accessing technology and drugs for development 
 
Bolivia has historically lagged behind its countries comparators (both from the same income group 
and from the same region) in terms of access to and development of technology. This is true for 
telephone, internet and personal computers, and applies to measures of access, usage as well as 
quality, while the country is faring pretty well in terms of affordability, as shown in Table 15.  
 
Table 15: ICT indicators for Bolivia in international perspective 
   Bolivia  Lower-middle income  Latin America 
 
2000  2008  2008  2008 
Access 
        Telephone lines (per 100 people)  6.1  7.1  13.6  18.5 
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)  7  49.8  47  80.3 
Fixed Internet subscribers (per 100 people)  0.5  2.1  5.6  6.2 
Personal computers (per 100 people)  1.7  2.4  4.5  11.5 
Usage          Internet users (per 100 people)  1.4  10.8  13.9  28.9 
Quality          Population covered by mobile network (%)  43  46  77  92 
Fixed broadband subscribers (% of total 
Internet subscribers)  0  17.1  40.4  88.8 
International Internet bandwidth 
(bits/second/person)  2  225  153  1,391 
Affordability          Residential fixed line tariff (US$/month)  —  22.7  4.8  10.4 
Mobile cellular prepaid tariff (US$/month)  —  5.9  8.4  9.6 
Fixed broadband Internet access tariff 
(US$/month)  —  33.5  31.4  34 
Source: World Bank (2009). 
 
This  relative  backwardness  is  obviously  problematic  in  terms  of  both  economic  and  social 
development, and only in certain areas does the country seem to be catching up. However, in 2008 
only 46% of the population was covered by a mobile telephone network, similarly, only 2.1 of 
Bolivians had an internet subscription in 2008. These figures hide a large heterogeneity between 
rural and urban areas, with rural dwellers having really poor access to technology. It is not clear to 
what extent the recent nationalisation of the national telephone provider Entel (which is the fixed 
line monopolist and the largest player in the mobile sector) may help in expanding access or the 
population as well as reducing costs, which are primary objectives of nationalisation.  
 
The international community could have a role to play to try to improve access to technology in 
Bolivia.  This  is  especially  the  case  through  assistance  in  the  development  of  a  regulatory 
framework in the telecommunication sector, which would help advance the technological frontier in 
the country. On the other hand, the international community may have a limited role as far as the 
development of public–private partnerships – often a model called for in developing countries – is 
concerned, given the current wave of anti-private involvement mood in public utilities in Bolivia.  
 
Similarly, and perhaps more worryingly, access to drugs is problematic for the poorer section of the 
society in Bolivia. A recent study carried out across six of the nine country’s provinces (AIS, 2009) 
reveals that there is a great shortage of generic drugs, especially in public pharmacies, and the 
price of both generic and branded drugs is higher than international prices. The costs for almost 
any type of treatment in Bolivia is substantial for a worker and it becomes prohibitive for certain 
treatments, such as in the case of respiratory infections.  43 
 
In light of this scenario, aside from the actions taken independently by the national government, the 
international community could help Bolivia improve the accessibility of drugs especially for poor 
people.  One  viable  way  to  act  could  be  through  the  establishment  of  patent  pools,  in  which 
different patent holders, such as companies, universities or research institutes, would voluntarily 
make  their  patents available  to  Bolivia  on  a  non-exclusive  basis  (UN,  2009).  In  exchange for 
payment of a royalty to the  pool to remunerate the patent holders, generic manufacturers can 
obtain a licence to access patents in the pool in order to produce specific medicines, make further 
improvements to them and produce and sell them in developing countries at low cost.  
 
Moreover,  countries with manufacturing capacity should facilitate both the exporting of generic 
medicines to Bolivia (exploiting the flexibilities in the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights) agreement), and, where possible, the exchange of technology transfer between 
developed countries and Bolivia for the production of essential medicines.  
 
4.5  Summary on development finance flows 
 
Table 16 is an overview table on changes in development finance (flows which finance the balance 
of payments) over 2008 to 2009. Not all the relevant data are available,  but some conclusions 
emerge on the basis of estimates so far. 
 
Development finance flows deteriorated considerably in the case of Bolivia, by about $820 million. 
The IMF estimates the decrease in external debt changing inflows as worth 12.3% of GDP. An 
extension of DFQF to all LDCs would not help Bolivia – it would lose around $72 million in export 
revenues – but a decrease in OECD tariffs and subsidies on an MFN basis would not harm Bolivia 
much ($0.7 million). Public debt increased by 2% of GDP over 2008-2009, external debt by 1% of 
GDP. 
 
Table 16: Bolivia – development finance and other flows over 2008-2009 














Foreign direct investment  Banco Central, 2008 and 2009  508  - 84 
Portfolio flows (balance of 
payments, portfolio 
investment) 
Banco Central, 2008 and 2009  -208  22 
International bank lending  BIS Sep 2008-Dec 2009  459  291 
Trade balance (goods)  ITC trade map using US, EU and 
BRIC countries 
1836  -1014 
Official development 
assistance 
ODA   579  0 
Remittances   Forecast (World Bank)  1144  -36 
Sum above      -821 
Memorandum items       
MDG GAP        
Benefits of DFQF to LDCs 
by OECD 
Bouet et al. (2010)    0.03% decrease in 
exports (around $72 
million) 
Preference erosion of a 
possible Doha round 
outcome 
ODI (2006), Appendix Table 1, 
upper bound 
  0.7  
Public external debt as % 
of GDP  
IMF’s DSA (data as a share of GDP) 
2008 data and 2009 forecasts  
14.3%   15.3%  44 
Public as % of GDP  IMF’s DSA (data as a share of 
GDP), general government debt 
excluding state-owned enterprises, 
2008 data and 2009 forecasts 
37.5%  39.4% 
Net debt creating flows 
(negative is an inflow) 
IMF’s DSA (data as a share of GDP) 
2008 data and 2009 forecasts  
-19.3%  -7.0% 
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5.  Conclusions 
 
A  favourable  international  environment  along  with  a  greater  focus  of  social  issues  by  the 
government are two important factors that have helped Bolivia’s recent progress in the attainment 
of MDGs. Except for MDG 2, the country seems to be set to achieve the goals (with gender 
equality already achieved). 
 
This advance has been achieved in a period of radical change in Bolivia’s dependence on MDG8-
related  external  flows  (ODA,  trade  and  debt).  The  composition  of  external  finance  in  public 
expenditure shifted from domination by ODA and debt forgiveness in the first half of the decade to 
domination  by  trade,  mainly  through  revenues  from  hydrocarbon  exports.  The  bonanza  of 
international prices of natural gas along with the introduction of the IDH – an additional tax of 32% 
on the value of natural gas production – in 2005 has generated a drastic increase in the absolute 
and relative value of hydrocarbon-related fiscal revenues during the decade. On the other hand, 
the debt relief operations of the beginning of the decade and declining ODA flows have meant 
reduced dependence on concessional flows. As a consequence, the international community has 
played an increasingly less important role, especially as far as the provision of funds for MDG-
related spending is concerned. 
 
This evidence supports the idea that the provision of additional financial resources may not be the 
priority  with  regard  to  organising  support  to  MDG  achievements.  The  international  community 
should keep financially supporting the country (possibly providing more harmonised and aligned 
aid) as this represents an important cushion against the eventual vagaries of international markets 
that may jeopardise Bolivia’s fiscal and economic resilience.  
 
But funding is not the scarcest resource  in  reaching  the  MDGs  in  Bolivia right now. Spending 
efficiently and effectively seems to be a more important area for support in Bolivia. In this sense, 
the donor community can build on its experience in devising effective public policies and efficient 
systems of policy implementation. 
 
The limited impact on Bolivian NTEs of the end of the ATPDEA with the US confirms the limited 
influence of preferential market access. Bolivia already enjoys good market access in its main 
markets and it is thus not clear to what extent better access in terms of tariffs to international 
markets would be beneficial. Probably better access through lower non-tariff barriers may be more 
relevant than improving access in terms of tariffs, given the importance of agricultural products – 
whose exports are often obstructed by non tariff barriers – in Bolivia’s NTEs. 
 
Access to markets would be made easier if Bolivia were better integrated with world markets, with 
its regional neighbours in particular. As a landlocked economy, this integration could make a real 
difference for its NTEs. This calls for the support of the international community through AfT, which 
has instead been worryingly dwindling in recent years. 
 
Finally, MDG8 could be pursued in Bolivia through support for improving access to technology 
(especially through technical assistance on the regulatory framework) and access to affordable 
drugs (through patent pools and incentivising exports of generic drugs to Bolivia from countries 




AIS (2009) ‘Estudio de Precios, Disponibilidad y Acceso de Medicamentos y Componentes del 
Precio en Bolivia’. 
Bouët, A., D.L. Debucquet, E. Dienesch and K. Elliot (2010) The Costs and Benefits of Duty-Free 
Quota-Free Market Access for Poor Countries: Who and What Matters? Working Paper 206. 
Washington, DC: CGD.  
Bulir, A.,  and  A.J.  Hamann  (2003)  ‘Aid Volatility: An Empirical Assessment’. IMF Staff Papers 
50(1): 64-89.. 
Chauvet,  L.  and  P.  Guillaumont  (2009)  ‘Aid,  Volatility,  and  Growth  Again: When  Aid  Volatility 
Matters and When it Does Not’. Review of Development Economics 13(3): 452-63. 
Hodrick, R.J. and E.C. Prescott (1997) ‘Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation’. 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 29(1): 1-16. 
Jemio,  L.C.  and  O.  Nina  (2010)  ‘Bolivia’. Global  Financial  Crisis  Discussion  Series  Paper  13: 
Phase 2. London: ODI.  
International Monetary Fund (2009) ‘DSA-Bolivia’. Washington, DC: IMF. 
International  Monetary  Fund  (2010)  ‘Bolivia:  Article  IV  Consultation’.  Country  Report  10/27. 
Washington, DC: IMF. 
Kaplinksy,  R.  and  M.  Morris  (2008)  ‘Do  the  Asian  Drivers  Undermine  Export-Orientated 
Industrialisation in SSA?’ World Development 36(2): 254-273. 
Overseas Development Institute (2006) ‘The Financial Architecture of Aid for Trade’. Report for 
ILEAP. 
Pallage, S. and M.A. Robe (2001) ‘Foreign Aid and the Business Cycle’. Review of International 
Economics 9(4): 641-672. 
Rodriguez C.A. (2009) Rompiendo con el “Proyectorado”; el Gobierno del MAS en Bolivia, Itaca 
Red Solidaria. 
Stevens, C., M. Meyn and J. Kennan (2008) ‘Duty Free Quota Free Access: What Is It Worth?’ 
Project Briefing 10, London: ODI.  
UDAPE (2004) ‘Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio en Bolivia: Tercero Informe de Progreso’. La 
Paz: UDAPE. 
UDAPE (2006) ‘Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio en Bolivia: Cuarto Informe de Progreso’. La 
Paz: UDAPE. 
UDAPE (2008) ‘Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio en Bolivia: Quinto Informe de Progreso’. La 
Paz: UDAPE. 
United Nations (2009) ‘Strengthening the Global Partnership for Development in a Time of Crisis’. 
MDG Gap Task Force Report. New York: UN. 
UN  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (2009)  Handbook  of  Statistics  2009.  Geneva: 
UNCTAD. 
Vos, R., M.V. Sanchez and C. Kaldewei (2008) ‘Latin America and the Caribbean’s Challenge to 
Reach the MDGs: Financing Options and Trade-offs’, in R. Vos, E. Ganuza, H. Lofgren and 
M. V. Sánchez Public Policies for Human Development. Feasible Financing Strategies for 
Achieving the MDGs in Latin America and the Caribbean. New York: UN. 
Vos, R. and M.V. Sanchez (2009) Impact of the Global Crisis on the Achievement of the MDGs in 
Latin America. Working Paper No. 74. New York: UN DESA. 




Figure A1: Bolivian natural gas prices  
 




Figure A2: Zinc prices, 1999-2008 
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